DHCP Inform vuln?

I have not verified this, but since most of my work was around DHCP related fingerprinting I found it interesting.  I wonder how many other DHCP clients are vuln to this on my test systems.

Anyway, this is a direct repost off of FD from earlier today with only slight modifications for formatting issues:

Title:           Microsoft DHCP INFORM Configuration Overwrite

Version:         1.0
Issue type:      Protocol Security Flaw
Affected vendor: Microsoft
Release date:    28/05/2014
Discovered by:   Laurent Gaffié
Advisory by:     Laurent Gaffié
Issue status:    Patch not available
============================================================

Summary
-------

A vulnerability in Windows DHCP (http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2131.txt) was
found on Windows OS versions ranging from Windows 2000 through to Windows server 2003.  This
vulnerability allows an attacker to remotely overwrite DNS, Gateway, IP Addresses, routing, WINS server, WPAD, and server configuration with no user interaction. Successful exploitation of this issue will result in a remote network configuration overwrite. Microsoft acknowledged the issue but has indicated no plans to
publish a patch to resolve it.


Technical details
-----------------

Windows 2003/XP machines are sending periodic DHCP INFORM requests and are not checking if the DHCP INFORM answer (DHCP ACK) is from the registered DHCP server/relay-server. Any local system may respond to these requests and overwrite a Windows 2003/XP network configuration by sending a properly formatted unicast reply.

Impact
------

Successful attempts will overwrite DNS, WPAD, WINS, gateway, and/or routing settings on the target system.

Affected products
-----------------

Windows:
- 2000
- XP
- 2003

Proof of concept
----------------
The DHCP.py utility found within the Responder toolkit can be used to exploit this vulnerability.

git clone https://github.com/Spiderlabs/Responder

Solution
--------
Set a DWORD registry key "UseInform" to "0" in each subfolder found in HKLM\SYSTEM\CCS\Services\TCP\Interfaces\

Response timeline
-----------------
* 18/04/2014 - Vendor notified.
* 18/04/2014 - Vendor acknowledges the advisory ( [MSRC]0050886 )
* 18/04/2014 - Suggested to vendor to run Responder on a A-D environment while looking at the DHCP issue for education purposes. Since multiple attempts were made to have them be aware that any A-D environment by default is vulnerable if Responder is running on the subnet. Also, MSRC was
asked what code change made this DHCP INFORM issue different on Windows
Vista than Windows Server 2003.
* 21/04/2014 - MSRC answers with an automated response.
* 08/05/2014 - Request for a reply.
* 14/05/2014 - MSRC reply and refuses to share their view on the code change, however they mention that 'The product team is investigating whether the RFC for a DHCPINFORM message is properly implemented'.
* 14/05/2014 - An email was sent to notify MSRC that no code change was requested, but the logic behind it. Also, MSRC was asked if they were successful with Responder.
* 16/05/2014 - MSRC closes [MSRC]0050886 and doesn't provide any info on if they were successful with Responder in their environment.


References
----------
* Responder: https://github.com/Spiderlabs/Responder
* http://g-laurent.blogspot.ca/
* https://twitter.com/PythonResponder
* http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2014/02/responder-20-owning-windows-networks-part-3.html

Accelerometer fingerprinting in mobile devices

Interesting research here.

http://www.scmagazineuk.com/phone-tilt-sensors-can-be-used-to-track-you/article/345712/

They say: “An accelerometer fingerprint can serve as an electronic cookie, empowering an adversary to consolidate data per user, and track them over space and time. Alarmingly, such a cookie is hard to erase, unless the accelerometer wears out to the degree that its fingerprint becomes inconsistent. We have not noticed any evidence of this in the nine months of experimentation with 107 accelerometers.”

Original writeup:
http://synrg.csl.illinois.edu/papers/AccelPrint_NDSS14.pdf

---

It would be interesting to know how accurate this really is once you start getting into 1000's and 100,000's of devices.  While I can see where you could determine general info about what device and accelerometer is it in, using it to track and individual user may be a bit more problematic.  With that said, I haven't read the 16 page right up yet, just the quick news article and with that I'll admit I scanned it.

Interesting approach and cool way to do it!